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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the cost of health care for retirees has increased at an
alarming rate. Contributing factors include the facts that Americans are
changing jobs more frequently than before, and that they are now retiring
before age sixty-five-the age at which they are eligible for Medicare.
Pursuant to employee benefit plans, employers have been forced to
shoulder much of this increase in healthcare costs.
Fairly recent estimates place the national liability for retiree health
benefits at a truly staggering amount- between four hundred million and
two trillion.' Naturally, companies that had agreed to pay these costs in a
previous era no longer wanted to pick up the tab. And when they began
terminating company welfare plans, a wave of employee-initiated litigation
ensued. The results were decidedly pro-employer in their rigid reliance on
plan documents even in the face of overwhelming evidence that employers
had represented that benefits were vested, or had failed to correct
employees' false assumptions that benefits were vested. This comment
examines this pro-employer sentiment in the federal courts and
recommends a reintroduction of the Yard-Man inference-the presumption
that benefits vest upon retirement-in order to counteract it.
f B.S.L.A. in German, Georgetown University, 1998; J.D. University of
Pennsylvania, 2001.
1. Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of Financial Accounting
Standards Board Rule 106, ERISA and Legal Challenges to Modification and Termination
of Post Retirement Health Care Benefit Plans, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 427, 431 (1994).
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II. THE BACKDROP TO THE RECENT WAVE OF RETIREE BENEFIT PLAN
TERMINATIONS AND LITIGATION.
A. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Rule 1062 Served as
Impetus and Pretext for Companies to Terminate Their Retiree
Welfare Benefit Plans.
The promulgation of FASB Rule 106 in the early 1990's brought
matters to a head. Essentially, this rule mandated a shift from a cash
method of accounting for retiree welfare benefits to an accrual method.
The rule significantly and adversely affected corporate financial statements.
In short, the rule's result is that any future obligation to pay retiree
welfare benefits for active employees must be recognized in current
financial statements. This requirement significantly reduces current
income for most corporations that employ more than five hundred people
and that have retiree welfare plans.3 For instance, Ford Motor Co. reported
a 7.5 billion dollar charge against current income in 1992.4 Similarly,
General Motors had to charge 20.8 billion in 1992 in order to comply with
the rule.' Some estimate that this reduction of current income for corporate
America equals approximately 1.5 trillion dollars.6
In the wake of these staggering paper losses, and the very real
increases in the cost of welfare benefits, many companies modified the
scope of their benefit plans. Other companies simply terminated their
welfare plans. In response to these modifications and terminations, a spate
of lawsuits arose.7 The courts hearing these cases have consistently sided
with the employers.8  These courts have repudiated the Yard-Man
inference, evidenced a strong distrust for evidence extrinsic to the written
plan documents, and used ERISA's preemption of state law as an excuse to
essentially ignore traditional contract claims, such as estoppel. In short,
these recent decisions have systematically tipped the scales in favor of
corporate America. Even in cases where employers make consistent
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 432.
5. Id.
6. Lee Berton, Clinton Plan to Pay Much of Premiums for Early Retirees Could Boost
Profits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at A2, C2.
7. Gregory J. Rossi, It Doesn't Add Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime Health
Benefits, Medicare, and Accounting Rule FASB 106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory Medical
Coverage for Retirees, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. & POL'Y 233, 241 (1996).
8. See generally Henry H. Rossbacher et al., ERISA's Dark Side: Retiree Benefits,
False Employer Promises and the Protective Judiciary, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 305, 319 (1997)
(noting a scenario where employers may escape liability to their labor force).
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representations that welfare benefits are vested, retirees will probably not
prevail under the current treatment of such claims by courts.
B. ERISA Requirements
When Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Ace (hereinafter "ERISA") in 1974, the protection of pension benefits took
center stage."' Welfare benefits were more of an afterthought, because, at
the time, employees usually retired at age sixty-five, and employers
accounted for any benefits they agreed to pay according to the cash
method. "
With regard to pensions, ERISA provides detailed and rigorous
vesting, funding and informational requirements. However, ERISA does
not subject welfare plans to such a comprehensive regime. Nevertheless, in
establishing a welfare benefit plan, the employer must act pursuant to a
written instrument (a "plan") and must provide the participants and their
beneficiaries with summary plan descriptions ("SPDs"). These summary
plan documents are required by statute to specify the circumstances that
will result in disqualification, ineligibility, denial, or loss of benefits.12 In
contrast to pensions, there are no vesting and funding requirements for
welfare benefit plans under ERISA. As such, there is no automatic vesting
of welfare benefit plans as there is with pension plans.
Automatic vesting 13 was rejected because the costs of such plans are
subject to fluctuation and unpredictable variables. 4 So, employers do
retain the right to modify or terminate welfare benefit plans. 5 But they can
contract to allow for vesting of these rights. Thus, employers can agree to
make the benefits irrevocable.
In analyzing whether an employer has done so, courts employ a
traditional contract framework. 16 In other words, if the governing plan
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2001).
10. Pension benefits are regular cash payments made by an employer after the
retirement of an employee.
11. Welfare benefits are salary benefits in addition to pension benefits that an employer
provides to, or for the benefit of, the employee. Examples include health insurance and life
insurance.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (2001).
13. Automatic vesting means that if an employer sets up a benefits plan, the employer
must pay out those benefits without changing or modifying them when an employee meets
the conditions of the plan.
14. Rossbacher et al., supra note 8, at 311.
15. See generally Curtis Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 86 (1993)
(holding that the reservation clause in the employer provided employee benefit plan was
sufficient notice for amending the plan).
16. Steven J. Sacher & William Payne, Retiree Health Benefits: Sixth Circuit Deals the
Retirees Out, 14 LAB. LAw. 475, 476 (1999).
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documents unambiguously reserve the right to amend or terminate the plan,
then any claim by disgruntled employees who were divested of their
benefits will be denied.17 On the other hand, if the plan unambiguously
grants lifetime benefits, then the employer cannot modify the plan. If the
governing plan documents are deemed ambiguous, then a court will
examine extrinsic evidence in order to glean the intent of the parties.
III. CONTRARY To ITS PURPOSE, ERISA HAS LEFT RETIREES WORSE-
OFF THAN THEY WERE UNDER OLD STATE LAW REGIMES
A. Judicial Approaches to Welfare Benefits Before ERISA
Early pre-ERISA decisions held that benefit plans were not
enforceable because employees did not give consideration for the benefits
and, as such, were mere "gratuities."' 8 An example of this early judicial
hostility towards employee claims for vested benefits can be found in
Menke v. Thompson.'9 Though Menke concerned a pension plan, it is
nonetheless instructive of the early judicial treatment of benefits programs
because of the overriding similarity between the two types of plans.
At the time of Menke's retirement from the Missouri Railroad
Company, his employer had a pension plan in place which provided that
every employee who had worked for the company for twenty-five
continuous years would receive pension benefits.20 However, no employee
was eligible for the pension if he or she had voluntarily left the service of
the company, even if it was only for one day. 2' Because he had gone on
strike in 1922, which had interrupted his twenty-five years of continuous
service, the board of pensions denied Menke pension benefits.22
In his complaint, Menke contended that his foreman had made an oral
promise to him that upon his return from the strike, he would be returned to
21full seniority as if he had never gone on strike. In light of this promise,
the special master found that the pension plan constituted a unilateral
17. Because welfare benefits do not automatically vest, employers frequently include
reservation of rights clauses in benefits plans in order to make clear that they can modify or
cease paying for benefits at will. However, these clauses are often ambiguous, especially
when viewed in relation to extra-plan indications that the employer intended the benefits to
vest at retirement.
18. William T. Payne, Lawsuits Challenging Termination or Modification of Retiree
Welfare Benefit: A Plaintiffs Perspective, 10 LAB. LAW. 91, 93-94 (1994).
19. 140 F.2d 786, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1944) (holding that a deceased employee's executrix
had no right to collect a pension).
20. Id. at 787.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 788.
23. Id. at 789.
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contract, which was binding upon the company once the employee had
complied with the conditions of the plan.24
The district court, though, rejected the findings of the special master.
It concluded that, as a matter of law, the pension plan was a "unilateral
voluntary undertaking by the railroad company" and that the company
could decide for itself who met the plan's eligibility requirements, which
the employer was free to set.25 The Eighth Circuit agreed in essence with
the district court. It held that the pension plan was entirely voluntary and
26its benefits were essentially gratuities.
In support of the proposition that the plan was a gratuity, the Eighth
Circuit noted that the plan did not depend on employee financial
contributions. Thus, the company bore the whole burden and could
"condition its bounty in such a manner as it saw fit."27 Additionally, no
statute in force required the company to take on such a burden.
2
1
Incidentally, the court ruled that even if the pension was a contract or an
offer, Menke had not complied with the terms of the offer. No acceptance
existed meaning that the employer was not bound to pay.29
In the years leading up to the enactment of ERISA, however courts
began to reject the notion that retiree welfare benefits and pension plans
were unenforceable because they were mere gratuities. Instead, courts
came to view these plans as binding on the employer, based on unilateral
contract theories. 30 The case of Upholsterers International Union of North
America v. American Pad & Textile Co. embodied this new line of
31reasoning.
3
In American Pad & Textile Co., the union sued the American Pad &
Textile Company for damages related to a violation of the terms of a
previously existing labor-management contract. The contract contained
language that "any employee with 15 years or more of continuous
service... at the time of retirement and having attained the age of 65
years, the Company will continue to cover such eligible retired employees
with $2,000 life insurance. 32 In fact, the Company had paid the premiums
on life insurance policies even in the years before the agreement in
24. Id.
25. Id. at 790.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Rose City Trans. Co. v. Portland, 533 P.2d 339, 342 (Ore. 1975). The court held
that an employer would be held liable for a benefits program if a three-part standard was
met. The first prong was that the employer must adopt a plan to provide retirement benefits.
The second requirement was that the employee must have been aware of the plan. The third
prong was that the employee must meet the plan's eligibility requirements. Id.
31. 372 F.2d 427, 428 (6th Cir. 1967).
32. Id. at 427.
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question.
33
In 1962, the company closed its Ohio plant and relocated to a new
plant in Louisiana. Despite the "will continue" language in the collective
bargaining agreement, American Pad & Textile Co. informed its retired
employees that it had decided to cease paying the premiums on the life
insurance policies.34 At trial, the company contended that the words "will
continue" should be read in conjunction with the words "for the term of this
contract., 35 The retirees disagreed.
The Sixth Circuit held that the word "continue" in the key provision
was ambiguous.36 The court went on to say that the fact that the provision
in question did not contain limiting language, while a second provision
relating to other benefits did, lent credibility to the union's interpretation.
More significantly, the court held that, in view of the company's practice of
paying the life insurance premium which was formalized in the agreement
with the union, the clause was "an employee benefit provision which vests
when the employee service called for is fully performed. 38 In other words,
this employee benefit provision was a unilateral contract. For these
reasons, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the retirees.39
In the wake of American Pad & Textile Co., courts began to look upon
welfare benefits as a means of deferred compensation.40 Courts found the
relative bargaining strengths of the parties so unequal that they often
refused to give effect to arguably ambiguous reservation clauses.4' In
short, employees were better protected under the old state law regimes that
existed before the enactment of ERISA.
B. The Judicial Treatment of Welfare Benefit Plans After ERISA has
Made Retirees Worse Off
For the sake of uniformity, ERISA preempts all prior existing state
law on the subject of retiree welfare benefits.42 However, Congress
intended federal courts to develop a federal common law to fill in gaps
33. Id. at 428.
34. Id. at 427.
35. Id. at 428.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 429.
40. Payne, supra note 18, at 95.
41. Id. See also Evo v. Jomac, Inc., 289 A.2d 551, 557 (N.J. 1972) (interpreting a
clause in the statute to protect an employee from forfeiture of accumulations); Stopford v.
Boonton Molding Co., 265 A.2d 657, 668 (N.J. 1970) (upholding a judgment against an
employer stating that an employee cannot collect a lump sum payment).
42. 29 U.S.C. §1144(a)(2001).
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caused by this preemption.43 In carrying out this charge, nothing
apparently prevents courts from turning to the preempted state common
law for guidance. With few exceptions, however, the federal courts have
not done so.
For instance, old common law claims for fraud and estoppel have
found no analogue in the federal system. Plan interpretation techniques
demonstrate reluctance to resort to extrinsic evidence. Exacerbating the
problem is the fact that most circuits have all but abandoned or rejected the
Yard-Man inference. In sum, retirees are worse-off now than they were
before the enactment of ERISA. This is extremely troubling since ERISA
was intended to do the opposite.44
IV. THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE
In 1974, Yard-Man Inc. and the union of United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Union
("UAW") entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement that
provided for retiree welfare benefits. 45 Yard-Man's plant, though, closed
approximately one year later. In 1977, the company notified former
employees that their existing health and life insurance benefits would cease
when the collective bargaining agreement expired.46 In finding for the
retirees, the Sixth Circuit recognized that, because the welfare benefits did
not automatically vest under ERISA, the issue became the parties' intent.47
So, the court focused its inquiry on the collective bargaining agreement
(hereinafter "CBA"). In examining the agreement, the court relied on the
basic principles of contractual interpretation to discern the intent of the
parties as to whether the benefits were irrevocable.45
The court introduced the highly controversial concept that retiree
benefits are status benefits that carry with them an inference that they
continue so long as the requisite status is maintained.49  Thus, when
examining the agreement to determine if it is ambiguous-which, in turn,
determines the need for extrinsic evidence-there is an inference that the
parties likely intended those benefits to continue for life.5° This is known
as the Yard-Man inference.
The court specifically stated that this inference by itself would not by
43. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974).
44. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989).
45. UAW v. Yard-Man Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1479.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1482.
50. Id.
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itself establish an intent to create vested benefits. 5' Rather, the court
explained that the inference would serve as contextual evidence of the
parties' intent in making the agreement. 2
The Yard-Man inference has two logical underpinnings.n First, it
takes the modem pre-ERISA view of welfare benefit contract interpretation
into account. For example, to determine intent, courts look at extrinsic
evidence from the outset rather than resorting to such evidence only in the
case of ambiguity. Second, retiree welfare benefits are a permissive subject
of bargaining, meaning that employers do not have to negotiate with unions
on this issue. As such, it behooves unions to take care of the issue once
and for all while it is on the table.
Presently, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits accept the Yard-
Man inference.54 But, in light of the Sprague decision discussed below, it
is somewhat questionable whether the inference is still viable in the Sixth
Circuit.55 The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have explicitly rejected the
Yard-Man inference, concluding that such an inference impermissibly
56shifts the burden to employers. However, this is not the case.
The inference is only evidence to be used in interpreting a contract
and, by itself, is not sufficient to carry the day. The Yard-Man court made
this exceedingly clear.57 Unfortunately, in the period after Yard-Man, some
courts did apply the inference much too broadly. A good example of this
broad application is seen in Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co.
58
51. Id.
52. Id. The Yard-Man court, in explaining the role of inference, stated that "as part of
the context from which the collective bargaining agreement arose, the nature of such
benefits simply provides another inference of intent." Id.
53. Payne, supra note 18, at 103.
54. Sacher & Payne, supra note 16, at 484.; see Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60,
64 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Yard-Man as part of its holding); United Steelworkers v.
Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1515 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Yard-Man to support the
finding that the language of the agreement at issue was unambiguous); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d
at 149 (opining that the collective bargaining process cannot be bypassed to modify vested
pension benefits).
55. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 406 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
benefits were not vested despite summary plan documents that asserted both that employees
would be entitled to free health insurance throughout retirement and that the terms of the
current plan were subject to change).
56. UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139-41 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the
Yard-Man inference and embracing the Eighth Circuit's criticism of the inference); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 908 F.2d 1252, 1261 n.12 (5th Cir.
1990) (finding merit in the Eighth Circuit's criticism of Yard-Man); Anderson v. Alpha
Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988) (disagreeing with Yard-Man to the
extent that it recognizes an inference of an intent to vest).
57. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 (stating that the consideration of certain factors
"simply provides another inference of intent. Standing alone, this factor would be
insufficient to find an intent to create interminable benefits").
58. 770 F.2d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the CBA at issue granted lifetime
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Powell arose in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. The
defendant, Powell Steel Co., contended that it retained the right to cancel
employee health insurance coverage because the obligation to provide such
coverage ended with the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement.59 The Powell court disagreed and held that the contract in
question unambiguously conferred lifetime benefits on the retirees due to
language in the pension and insurance agreements."' Relying on Yard-Man
and the fact that a union may not bargain away retiree benefits which have
already vested in particular individuals, the Powell court stated that
"normally retiree benefits are vested., 61  The Yard-Man inference, of
course, stood for no such thing. Rather, the inference is merely one thing
for a court to consider when analyzing contracts or plan documents for
ambiguity.
In any event, to many courts and commentators alike, Yard-Man came
to stand for this sort of excess which helped lead to its current disfavor.
This development comes at a time when some courts decisions imply that
the termination of retiree health benefits is an unfortunate but acceptable
sacrifice for the economic health of America's corporations.62
V. PLAN INTERPRETATION UNDER ERISA
Federal courts have placed an overwhelming emphasis on formal
written plan documents in cases regarding the termination of retiree welfare
benefit programs.63  Accordingly, both oral and written extra-plan
communications have diminished tremendously in importance. Extrinsic
evidence is rarely used to augment or change an agreement.64 More
importantly, it is also seldom used to determine whether an ambiguity
exists in a plan document that appears plain on its face.65
This approach has become a sword in the hand of employers, who can
frequently promise that employee benefits will last for life and not face
liability as long as they place a carefully worded reservation of rights
provision in the formal plan documents. Such an approach runs contrary to
health benefits to certain retirees).
59. Id. at 610.
60. Id. at 614.
61. Id. at 613.
62. Rossbacher et al., supra note 8, at 347.
63. Alison M. Sulentic, Promises, Promises: Using the Parol Evidence in ERISA
Litigation, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 4 (2000).
64. See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (1lth Cir. 1986) (disallowing
oral modifications of a written agreement).
65. See Sulentic, supra note 63, at 5; see also Priority Solutions, Inc. v. Cigna, 1999
WL 1057202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999) (stating that Cigna was not free to disregard
the plain meaning of the plan).
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both the congressional intent in the enactment of ERISA and pre-ERISA
state common law constructs.
A. ERISA Plans are Analyzed Under the Rubric of Contract Law
ERISA broadly preempts state law in the area of pension and welfare
benefits. Nonetheless, most courts have recognized that these welfare and
pension plans should be analyzed under contract and trust law.66 As such, a
brief examination of the two competing approaches to contract analysis and
the role of extrinsic evidence within these paradigms is in order.
Skepticism of and extreme reluctance to resort to extrinsic evidence
characterizes the formalistic approach espoused by Williston. In dealing
with both whether a contract is integrated clauses and basic contract
interpretation, the Williston approach concerns itself first and foremost
with the 'four corners' of the document in question.67 In contrast, the
Corbinian or modern approach, propounds that extrinsic evidence is
necessary for the analysis and interpretation of the integration issue and the
611overall contract. In other words, under this modern approach courts will
consider extrinsic evidence even if the meaning of the written plan or
contract is plain on its face. In light of ERISA's contractual nature, the
tension between the modem and traditional paradigms plays an important
role in ERISA plan litigation.
1. Federal Courts Now Strictly Adhere to the Principle That the
Plan Rules
Section 402 of ERISA requires that all employee benefit plans be
reduced to writing.69 As Alison Sulentic argues, many courts have used
this rule to protect employers from promises that were never formally made
a part of the plan document, but carry much more weight with the
employees.7 ° She states, "ERISA's mandate of a written plan document
66. See, e.g., Brewer v. Protexall, Inc., 50 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
health benefit plans governed by ERISA should be interpreted by federal common law rules
of contract interpretation); Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of AmD., 873 F.2d 486, 489
(Ist Cir. 1989) (stating that ERISA-regulated group life insurance policies must be
interpreted under principles of federal substantive law, including the common sense canons
of contract interpretation).
67. See, e.g., John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol
Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333, 338 (1967)
(stating that when a writing appears complete on its face, it is deemed to be a total
integration).
68. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573-96, at 356 (1960 & Supp. 1999)
69. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, § 402
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2001)).
70. Sulentic, supra note 63, at 38 n.191.
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has come to justify the assertion that the written plan embodies the entire
plan." 7' This proposition is fraught with internal inconsistencies.
First, employees rarely, if ever, get to meaningfully participate in the
drafting of the plan documents. Furthermore, such plans do not always
contain all the promises made in the context of the benefit plan. Moreover,
the actual utility of the written plan is somewhat limited because many plan
participants are not able to adequately understand the benefits outlined in
the formal plan document even if they were to read it.
72
More importantly, the written plan document rule is a part of the
73statute's fiduciary provisions. It is more properly understood as a
provision to protect employees by forcing the employer to reduce the plan
to writing so that all the key promises and benefits are in one place.74
Courts have long held that an ERISA plan can exist without any
formal plan document. In Dillingham, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit
announced that an ERISA plan exists if "from the surrounding
circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the intended benefits, a
class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and procedures for receiving
benefits."75  This test demonstrates that the absence of a written plan
"indicates a failure to adhere to fiduciary standards," not the absence of a
plan altogether.76 Despite the Dillinghman test, "courts have assumed that
the requirement of a written plan document signifies the exclusion of parol
evidence in a manner that goes far beyond the manner in which
commentators such as Corbin prescribe for the common law.
' 77
For instance, the Third Circuit, in In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d
143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996), said that section 402 operates like any other
common law integration clause and bars the introduction of parol evidence
to vary or contradict the written terms. In short, courts have interpreted
section 402 as a strict, statutorily-imposed merger clause that excludes the
consideration of extrinsic evidence to vary or augment the terms of the
plan, even in the face of numerous extra plan communications on the part
of the employer.78
71. Id. at 39.
72. David Chamy, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1601,
1618 (1996).
73. The obligation to reduce the plan to writing appears in the provisions that set forth
fiduciary obligations under ERISA. See also Sulentic, supra note 65, at 40 n.205 (stating
that the written plan document rule is part of ERISA's fiduciary provisions).
74. Sulentic, supra note 65, at 40 n.206 (stating ERISA's fiduciary provisions are
designed to force employers to maintain a plan document).
75. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
76. Sulentic, supra note 63, at 44-45 n.233 (citing Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372).
77. Id. at 47 n.244.
78. Id. at 46-48 nn. 243-250 (noting that some courts have gone far beyond what Corbin
prescribes for common law exclusion of parol evidence to interpret the rule as a statutorily
imposed integration clause).
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2. Plan (Contract) Interpretation Under ERISA
It is fairly well settled that courts turn to extrinsic evidence to
interpret the terms of even an integrated contract only when those terms are
ambiguous, or the terms are susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. 79 However, the controversial question remains as to how
one should determine whether a term or provision is ambiguous. The
formalistic versus modem debate as to the role of extrinsic evidence also
affects plan interpretation under ERISA.
For all the benefits that the 'four-comers' or formalistic approach may
offer, problems with this approach abound. For instance, the 'four-comers'
approach invites the interference of the judges' own subjective experiences.
80 Arguably it would be far better to rely upon extrinsic evidence that
relates directly to the agreement itself rather than the extrinsic evidence of
a judge's own personal experiences as to what a contract term means. To
this end, the modem approach argues that a term cannot be deemed
unambiguous without first considering the context of the agreement.
Nevertheless, in recent years judges have been reluctant to consider
extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation, particularly for ERISA plan
interpretation."' Some courts have gone so far as to hold that vesting of
welfare benefits cannot occur if the express language of the plan does not
provide for it.
82
Despite the concerns regarding the use of extrinsic evidence in
assessing ambiguity, a written plan document that accurately describes the
entire agreement faces no threat from parol evidence. 83 In any event, this
judicial hostility to extrinsic evidence, even in light of express promises of
lifetime benefits, makes the Yard-Man inference even more necessary.
It would function as an additional consideration for judges in making
the initial determination of ambiguity-not sufficient to carry the day, but a
counterweight to the current approach.
79. UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1480 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S.Ct. 1002 (1984).
80. See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir.
1980) (stating that "under a 'four corners' approach a judge sits in chambers and determines
from his point of view whether the written words before him are ambiguous").
81. Sulentic, supra note 63, at 60 (stating, "even when the extrinsic evidence strongly
suggests that the plan document is ambiguous, there is a deep-rooted reluctance to
acknowledge an ambiguity that is not patently obvious on the face of the document").
82. See, e.g., Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating
that the intent to vest must be found in the plan documents and must be stated in clear and
express language).
83. Sulentic, supra note 63, at 63.
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VI. RECENT CASES HAVE EMBRACED PRINCIPLES THAT MAKE IT MUCH
HARDER FOR THE RETIREES' CLAIMS To SUCCEED
A. Sprague
Chief among pro-employer cases is Sprague v. General Motors
Corp. In 1985, General Motors ("GM") became fully self-insured. Its
welfare benefit plan contained language stating that GM reserved the right
to modify or terminate the benefits. However, GM issued a number of
summary plan descriptions ("SPDs"), which contained lifetime language
such as "at no cost to them.., for their lifetimes."85 Many of these SPDs
did not contain language reserving the right to modify or terminate the
benefits.86 Additionally, plant officials made numerous oral and written
assurances to the early retirees that their benefits would last for the
remainder of their lives.87
Analyzing this fact pattern, the court began with the premise that
because ERISA specifically exempts welfare plans from the vesting
requirements of pension plans, an employer's commitment to vest should
"not be inferred lightly."88 In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit ignored its own
Yard-Man precedent, severely limited the viability of equitable estoppel,
and significantly departed from generally accepted principles of welfare
benefit plan interpretation under ERISA.
1. The Contract/ Vesting Question
Prior to Sprague, in Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., the Sixth Circuit had held that the statements in SPDs are
binding, and if they conflict with those in the plan itself, then the SPD shall
govern. 9 The court in Sprague considerably narrowed this holding by
explaining that Edwards did not apply to silence.90 Because the SPD is by
definition a summary, the Sprague court concluded that there is no conflict
with the plan if a SPD with lifetime language does not contain reservation
84. Sprague, 133 F.3d at406.
85. Id. at 393-94.
86. Id. at 400.
87. Id. at 395.
88. Id. at 400.
89. Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1988).
90. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 401.
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language. 9' This holding particularly hurts retirees and also runs contrary
to the statutory purpose of the SPDs.
SPDs are supposed to describe the circumstances that will result in
termination of benefits.9 z Surely, a reservation of rights is a circumstance
resulting in termination. Moreover, most circuits have also held that SPDs
should take precedent over the plan.93 Courts defer to SPDs because they
are supposed to be written in such a way that the average plan participant
can understand them, whereas the plan itself is often incomprehensible to
the average participant.94
The Sprague court also held that there is no ambiguity in a situation in
which the SPD tells participants both that the terms of the current plan
entitle them to free health insurance throughout retirement and that the
terms of the current plan are subject to change.95  Rather the court
dismissed this seemingly contradictory SPD as a "qualified promise.,
96
Therefore, the court did not look at the extrinsic evidence, including the
many promises that the benefits were for life.
The Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all rejected the Sixth
Circuit's approach. 97 Even the circuits that have found similar provisions
unambiguously in favor of non-vesting have declined to adopt an absolute
rule against vesting in such circumstances.98
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit's approach in Sprague might still be
acceptable if the court had allowed the retirees to bring claims to address
91. Id. at 400.
92. Payne, supra note 18, at 109.
93. Rossbacher et al., supra note 8, at 314. See, e.g., Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50
F.3d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that if there is a conflict between the provisions of a
summary policy and the policy itself, the terms in the summary control).
94. Payne, supra note 18, at 110; See also 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2001).
95. Sprague, 133 F.3d at401.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 122 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a plan that both promised lifetime benefits and reserved the right to terminate benefits was
ambiguous); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
employees have vested rights when plan documents both asserted that rights were vested,
and in separate documents, reserved the right to terminate benefits); Stewart v. K.H.D.
Deutz of America, Corp., 980 F.2d 698, 703-04 (11 th Cir. 1993) (stating that because both
clauses could not be given full effect and the agreement did not state which should be
qualified, the terms of the agreement were ambiguous); Sacher & Payne, supra note 16, at
485.
98. See Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
general reservation of rights clause unambiguously controls a promise of continued health
care benefits to retirees); h re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d
896, 904 n. I1 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that a reservation of rights will always prevail over a
promise of benefits and noting that, due to the abundance of ERISA plans and the differing
benefits these plans provide, each case is fact specific and the court must make its
determination of the benefits provided based on the language of the particular plan it has
been called upon to review); Sacher & Payne, supra note 16, at 485.
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the many representations of lifetime benefits that the company made, and
its failure to correct the impression of employees that the benefits were for
life. However, the Sprague court essentially closed the door to estoppel
claims and to claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section
404(a)(1), the theoretical credibility of which the Supreme Court upheld in
Varity Corp. v. Howe.99
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The court in Sprague held that, although GM may have been acting as
a fiduciary when it stated that the plans would be paid for life, they did not
deliberately mislead employees, which the court considered an integral part
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.0 In other words, when GM said the
benefits were for life, the corporation intended to pay the benefits for life.
Furthermore, according to the court, ERISA did not require GM to include
the reservation of termination rights in the SPDs.' '
Apparently, the court decided that employers do not wear their
fiduciary hats when they modify a plan, but only face fiduciary liability
under ERISA for making misrepresentations that are deliberately
misleading. As such, a breach of fiduciary duty claim will not succeed in
federal court unless the employer deliberately tried to hurt the employees.
This requirement that plaintiffs prove intent to harm is a very high bar for
employees who have lost their benefits.
3. Equitable Estoppel
While most courts do not recognize a claim of estoppel in ERISA plan
litigation, 10 2 the Sprague court validated the possibility of the claim. But
what the court gave with one hand, it took away with the other. The court
held that there cannot be estoppel when the relied-on representation runs
counter to the unambiguous terms of the plan.'0 3 Of course, the Sprague
court also held that lifetime language and reservation clauses in the same
document do not create ambiguity, nor is there an ambiguity if an SPD
contains lifetime language and no reservation of rights.
In light of this holding, it is hard to imagine a situation in which plan
documents would appear so ambiguous as to permit a viable estoppel
claim. Indeed, under Sprague's estoppel standard, retirees could only bring
99. 516 U.S. 489, 504-07 (1996) (recognizing the existence of a breach of fiduciary
duty claim under ERISA).
100. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 405.
101. Id. at 406.
102. Rossi, supra note 7, at 248.
103. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404.
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a viable claim when they could prevail under the contract or vested right
theory anyway (i.e. when the contract is ambiguous and favorable extrinsic
evidence is admissible).
4. The Yard-Man Inference
Lastly, the court in Sprague did not mention the Yard-Man inference,
a doctrine that the Sixth Circuit actually developed. This omission might
stem from the fact that the inference was developed in the context of the
collective bargaining agreements and the Labor Management Relations
Act, whereas Sprague was a non-union case.' °4 However, circuit courts
that have accepted the inference have not made a distinction between union
and non-union employees in this matter. 05 The Sprague court certainly did
not explicitly make such a distinction.
Much of the reasoning behind the development of the Yard-Man
inference is equally valid in the non-union, ERISA-governed context.
Congress did not intend ERISA to make employees worse-off than they
were before its enactment. Additionally, salaried employees are equally, if
not more, powerless than union employees when bargaining for ERISA-
type benefits. More importantly, prior to ERISA, state courts were much
more disposed to find in favor of retirees than they are now. State courts
accepted both estoppel and fraud claims and took the modem view of
contract interpretation. 10 6 Given the Sprague court's rejection of these
principles, the reinstitution of the Yard-Man inference becomes even more
important to effect the true goal of ERISA.
B. Skinner Engine Co.
UAW v. Skinner Engine Co. 107 also reflects the increasing judicial
hostility to retirees, who have lost their welfare benefits. I examine the
contract claim, breach of fiduciary duty claim, and equitable estopple claim
in turn.
1. Contract Claim
In the wake of FASB Statement No. 106, the Skinner Engine Co.
eliminated or modified retiree health benefits at the expiration of its 1993
104. UAW v. Yard-Man Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983).
105. Sacher & Payne, supra note 16, at 498.
106. See generally Payne, supra note 18 (stating that courts generally accept the estoppel
principles when the plaintiff shows that the defendant made a material misrepresentation
upon which the plaintiffs reasonably relied to their detriment).
107. 188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999).
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collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the UAW."" As a
preliminary matter, the court rejected the Yard-Man inference and began its
analysis with the familiar but controversial premise that because ERISA
does not provide for the automatic vesting of welfare plans, intent to vest
"must not be inferred lightly"'09 and must be stated in clear and express
language." °
The CBAs did have language to the effect that the benefits would
"continue" and "shall remain.' However, the court ruled that these terms
did not constitute clear and express language in favor of vesting." 2 The
court also rejected the union's argument that the phrases were, at the very
least, ambiguous and should at least survive summary judgment. "
3
In rejecting this contention, the court first noted that "reference must
be made to the 'contract language, the meanings suggested by counsel, and
the extrinsic evidence offered in support of each interpretation.""' 4 The
court concluded that it was not reasonable to interpret the phrases as
conferring lifetime, vested benefits." 5 Accordingly, no ambiguity existed.
The court believed that the phrases merely related back to prior
agreements." 6 So, in the case of benefits carried over, the new agreement
stated "will continue" or "shall remain."'"17 In case of new benefits, the
agreements stated that they "will be obtained, will provide" or "will be
instituted."'" 8  Moreover, while the agreements almost invariably
mentioned vesting with regard to pension benefits, they never mentioned it
with regard to welfare benefits." 9
Finally, the court rejected the testimony of various union members and
of a former Skinner executive that the welfare benefits were understood
during negotiations as vested and thus irrevocable.'20 The court rejected
this testimony with the somewhat cryptic statement that, while courts
should resort to extrinsic evidence to determine if a contract is ambiguous,
it may not be used to create an ambiguity where none exists.'
21
However, the court examined and accepted other extrinsic evidence,
like the fact that Skinner continued to provide benefits to employees and
108. Id. at 136.
109. Id. at 139.
110. Id.
I IIL Id. at 141.
112. Id. at 142.
113. Id. at 144.
114. Id. at 142.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 143.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 137-38.
120. Id. at 144-45.
121. Id. at 145.
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retirees during strikes.122 Additionally, the court used expired CBA's in
order to determine that the phrases represented merely a limited promise to
continue the benefits in the current CBA. Moreover, the court recognized
that the trier of fact may not merely consider "whether the language is clear
from its point of view." 2 3 Further, the court stated that the appellant's
conclusion had legitimacy only if viewed in a vacuum (i.e. divorced from
its context). 24 In short, the court actually did use considerable extrinsic
evidence to determine that the plan did not vest rights.
One finds it hard to explain why the court deemed these instances of
extrinsic evidence worthwhile, but found that the highly probative
testimony of an executive merely created an ambiguity "where none exists"
rejecting it as based on the "notion of moral responsibility."'
l
Nevertheless, this distinction becomes much clearer when viewed in the
context of the recent judicial activism for employers evidenced in Sprague.
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Skinner court also rejected the retirees' breach of fiduciary duty
claim under section 404(a)(1) of ERISA. Taking a page out of Sprague,
the court said that there was no "competent evidence which suggests that
the company made any affirmative misrepresentations" or deliberately
126misled the retirees. Additionally, the court held that there existed no
duty on the company's part to correct a false assumption on the part of the
employees if it did not create the misunderstanding and did not remain
silent when questioned about its benefits.'27
3. Equitable Estoppel
The Skinner court also rejected an equitable estoppel claim under
ERISA.128 The court's reasoning again mirrored that of Sprague. The
court held that there cannot be reasonable reliance when there is an
unambiguous reservation of rights in the plan documents. 129 The trial court
found such a reservation in the SPD. Nevertheless, both parties conceded
that these SPD's were never provided to plan beneficiaries. As such, these
SPD's did not constitute a part of the governing plan documents.
Nonetheless, the court refused to reverse the trial court's granting of
122. Id. at 144.
123. Id. at 142.
124. Id. at 143.
125. Id. at 146.
126. Id. at 150.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 151.
129. Id. at 150-51.
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summary judgment because the retirees did not show evidence of
detrimental reliance.
1 30
VII. THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE SHOULD BE RE-INSTITrUTED OR
INTRODUCED To COUNTERACT THE RECENT ANTI-RETIREE JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM.
The best solution to the judicial activism evident in Skinner and
Sprague is the introduction or re-institution of the Yard-Man inference.
This is particularly true in the Sixth Circuit and other circuits that have
taken the hard-line stance against retirees that if the contract or plan does
not unambiguously vest rights, then the retiree does not have recourse.
The inference does not, as some courts and commentators have
described, shift the burden to the defendants (the employers). Rather, the
inference determines whether plan documents are ambiguous, and,
therefore, whether to allow the introduction of favorable extrinsic evidence
to discern intent.
This inference does have the potential to be abused. Presently,
however, federal courts are consistently abusing the ERISA preemption of
state law. The inference would function as a way to keep this activism in
check. At the very least, having the Yard-Man inference in mind when
reviewing plan documents will assist trial courts to keep ERISA's pro-
employee intent in mind.13 1 In light of the judicial hostility to employees, it
is likely that this could only be accomplished through statutory means.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Beginning in 1992, companies discovered a timely pretext to justify
the elimination of company-funded retiree welfare benefit programs. The
cases discussed above, as well others, demonstrate "an overriding judicial
determination that retiree health care is wildly expensive, threatening the
solvency of corporate America.' 32
Protecting the solvency of corporate America was not Congress's
intent in enacting ERISA. ERISA's preemption of state law that favored
retirees did not aim to make the retirees worse-off or to change the relative
burdens on them vis-a-vis their former employers. Indeed, the Supreme
Court said as much in Firestone Tire and Rubber. On the contrary, ERISA
was enacted to bring uniformity and to make sure that employers reduced
their plans to writing so that employees could reasonably avail themselves
130. Id. at 151-52.
131. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (stating that
ERISA was enacted to "protect the interests of employees").
132. Rossbacher et al., supra note 8, at 308.
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of the terms of the plan.
Cases like Skinner and Sprague demonstrate just how far the courts
have diverged from Congress's intent. Estoppel and breach of fiduciary
duty claims are essentially dead letters even in cases in which the employer
has made extra-plan misrepresentations or has refrained from correcting
false assumptions. Courts have also been consistently unwilling to find
either that the contract unambiguously vests or is at least so ambiguous as
to allow extrinsic evidence that very often favors the retirees. In light of
these judicial tendencies, the Yard-Man inference becomes a necessary tool
for retirees.
